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English Summary
In this dissertation I address a debate in philosophical moral psychology that
focuses on the nature of moral character traits. This debate has been a hot topic
in philosophy in the last 15 years or so. In turn, it is based on a related debate in
personality and social psychology that can be traced by as far as the 1920s, but
had its heyday from the late ‘60s to the ‘80s. The debate, in both psychology
and philosophy, turns on the question of how much of an impact people’s
personality/character traits have on their behaviour, and what this can tell us
about the nature of these personality/character traits.
Whilst there is an important aspect of this debate that is conceptual in nature,
it is also empirically informed. The debate in psychology focused strongly on the
relation of traits to behaviour, and was rooted in a large array of experiments that
measured the way people behave, and how their behaviour can be influenced by
altering environmental stimuli. This methodology was taken up by philosophers
who used this behavioural data as the basis of a challenge to moral character traits.
This dissertation addresses the philosophical debate about moral character
traits. I argue that the position of philosophical situationism – roughly, the view
that virtues and vices are not commonly possessed by people – is not justified by
the evidence or argument that its proponents offer. In particular, I argue that
the situationist makes the case against virtues, at best, but offers little in
support of the view that people do not routinely possess vices. I argue for the
position that people might possess such vices – a view I call character pessimism
– to show that situationism is not warranted.
In Chapter 1, I introduce the topic of the dissertation and refine my terms. I
clarify the meaning of character that I shall be arguing about, and briefly discuss
the recent turn to empirical evidence in moral psychology. I then introduce the
situationist challenge to character, argued for most prominently by John Doris
and Gilbert Harman. I then outline how I will argue against their challenge, and
give an overview of the rest of the dissertation.
In Chapter 2, I describe the view of situationism in detail. I begin by giving
some history of the movement, and how the roots of the philosophical debate stem
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from both the psychological debate and from the renaissance of virtue ethics as a
moral theory in 20th century philosophy. I then give a detailed account of three
key sections of the experimental literature that constitute (part of) the empirical
basis of philosophical situationism. These are: Milgram’s ‘obedience experiments’,
the ‘bystander effect’ experiments, the ‘mood effect’ experiments. I also describe
how some evidence is offered that seems to show people performing admirable
actions. As a result, situationists claim that people’s behaviour is not morally
consistent. They do not behave consistently helpfully or unhelpfully. Rather, the
situationist claims, people’s behaviour is ‘fragmented’; they help sometimes and
not other times, and it is the environmental differences that determine this. Next, I
contrast a number of different positions that can all be thought of as ‘philosophical
situationism’. The core of the view is a challenge to the empirical viability of the
belief that people typically possess ‘global’ virtues and vices, where ‘global’ roughly
refers to the property of being suitably stable over time and manifesting in relevant
behaviour across a variety of differing but appropriate situations. Nonetheless,
some situationists hold that character trait terminology should be eliminated as
there are no such traits at all. Others hold that the empirical evidence supports
the possession of ‘local’ traits, which can be stable over time but only manifest in
trait-relevant behaviour in a narrowly construed set of situations, such as ‘exam-
honesty’ rather than honesty that manifests across many different domains of
action. Other situationists argue that people have traits that appear global when
they are in the right kinds of social settings. But when we find ourselves in
unfamiliar surroundings, or without the reinforcing effect of our usual confidents,
the traits we have are not strong enough to produce trait-relevant behaviour in
many trait-relevant situations.
Situationists may also disagree about what follows from the conclusion that
global traits are not widely possessed. An alternative to the eliminativism just
mentioned is to focus on making trait attributions in the right circumstances so
as to encourage desirable behaviour. One view is that telling people they have a
particular virtue in the right way and at the right time can cause them to act in
line with that virtue, a desirable goal. What follows from the various versions of
situationism is not limited to how and when we should use the language of
character traits. Normative prescriptions about how we should seek to live well
differ depending on what kinds of character traits are seen as viable. However, a
common theme to situationism is an emphasis on situation management to
improve behaviour, focusing on being in the right kinds of situations rather than
developing the character to cope with a variety of challenging situations.
In Chapter 3, I describe and weigh the value of the typical suite of responses to
situationism that have been offered by the two theoretical domains most
obviously under attack: virtue ethics and personality psychology. The aim is to
consider whether there is already a response in the literature that is sufficient to
meet the situationist’s critique of virtue ethics, or whether the responses from
trait psychologists can help us in meeting the challenge of philosophical
situationism. First, I consider arguments from various authors that situationism
misunderstands the nature of character that it challenges. Second, that virtue
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ethicists have always held that possession of virtue is likely to be rare, so an
empirical argument that it is rare is not a challenge to their view. Third, that
purely observing people’s behaviour is poor evidence for learning about their
character. Fourth, that situationists take the people in the experiments they cite
to be in specific trait-relevant situations, but that the situations are classified by
the experimenter and not by the people involved. What is of interest, this
response argues, is how people act when they take themselves to be in the
relevant kind of situation. Their construal of the situation may differ from that
of the experimenter. Fifth, I consider the ways a number of authors have sought
to compromise between the empirical demands that situationism raises and their
conceptual beliefs about the nature of character. Sixth, I consider a number of
methodological challenges to specific experiments cited in support of
situationism. I conclude that whilst many of these objections raise important
points that help to clarify exactly what the challenge of situationism is, none of
them, nor in combination, are sufficient to fully meet the situationist critique.
In the second half of the chapter, I turn to a number of ways that personality
psychologists responded to the initial challenge of situationism in psychology.
Given the comparatively long history of that debate we can expect a more
developed literature that may help to inform philosophical arguments. After
introducing the topic of trait theory I turn to how modern theorists conceive of
traits. A consensus has emerged around a small core of very broad personality
traits that receives a certain level of empirical support. This is the so-called ‘five
factor model’ of traits. I then discuss how trait theorists focused on the
possibility of aggregating behaviours to produce much stronger correlations
between attributions of particular traits and displays of trait-relevant behaviour.
The combination of a much-reduced set of traits and utilising aggregation
techniques has helped advocates defend a revised account of personality traits
from the trait sceptic. I then consider an alternative development in personality
psychology that resulted from the situationist critique of personality, the
‘cognitive affective personality system’ or CAPS theory. Whilst advocates of this
approach turn their focus away from a discussion of traits as such, they argue for
stable features of personality that can generate reasonable predictive power on
the basis of individual behaviour patterns seen in behavioural testing. This
theory focuses on the importance of understanding the meaning of a situation to
the person involved and how their own ongoing history shapes their very
individualised, yet stable, pattern of behavioural responses. I conclude that there
are features from personality psychology that can help move the philosophical
debate forward, but the different end goals of defending personality traits rather
than moral character traits means that these responses are not sufficient to meet
the challenge of philosophical situationism either.
In Chapter 4, I develop my core response to situationism: that the situationist fails
to make the case against the widespread possession of global vices. As vices are a
subset of traits, the possibility of the former entails the possibility of the latter, thus
the situationist conclusion is not warranted. I first formalise the sceptical argument
at the heart of philosophical situationism. Then I clarify what standard of evidence
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the situationist would take to warrant attribution of traits, and what evidence
would be enough to warrant the belief that someone does not have a particular
trait. I note that the kind of evidence they cite does not straightforwardly meet
this standard. Consequently, I argue, the situationist argument relies on a further
move: comparing the patterns of behaviour performed by many people in one-off
experimental settings with the patterns they would expect to see, were those people
to possess global traits. Next, I argue that the situationist makes an unwarranted
assumption in formulating these expected patterns of behaviour; namely, if people
possess global traits, then they possess virtues. This tacit assumption, that I call
the ‘Goodness Thesis’, is necessary to generate the situationist conclusion from
the evidence they cite. But this tacit assumption is not justified by evidence or
argument, so the conclusion is not warranted.
This argument turns in part on whether possession of vices could explain the
variant behaviour seen in the experiments. I demonstrate how the view I call
‘character pessimism’ offers new and plausible accounts of how behaviour in some
of the experiments cited most frequently by situationists might be caused by
stable vices. Having argued that some key experimental behaviour could be
explained by possession of global vices, I consider whether the case against
certain helping-related virtues can be augmented with a ‘generalising strategy’ in
order to make the case against global traits in as a class. I conclude that whilst
generalising from evidence against one trait might justify a more general
scepticism about related traits, it does not straightforwardly justify scepticism
about global traits in general. To make the case against vices, evidence against
particular vices is required. Thus, I then consider whether such evidence against
vices exists. I discuss two experiments that reveal apparently non-selfish
behaviour, which might be taken as evidence against the vice of selfishness. I
argue that there are plausible explanations of the observed behaviour where it is
motivated by self-interest. Moreover, I argue, such cases are insufficient to meet
the burden of evidence against selfishness because it is the weight of evidential
findings, rather than single cases, that situationists take to justify their
scepticism of global traits.
I then consider evidence presented by Christian Miller that might suggest
people act selflessly for morally admirable reasons, such as being moved by
empathy, feeling ‘elevated’ by hearing about moral exemplars, or recalling moral
norms. There is a lot of evidence related to the impact of empathy on helping,
but, as Miller agrees, the motivation this feeling causes is highly unreliable and
in fact is liable to be overridden by self-interest. The evidence Miller cites in
relation to the other two is interesting but very preliminary. Thus, this evidence
does not make a case against possession of vices. I also consider evidence that
might be taken to show that people routinely behave honestly (as well as
dishonestly), and this might show that people do not possess the vice of
dishonesty. In this case, I argue that Miller’s account of dishonesty is overly
demanding, and that possessing the vice of dishonesty is compatible with
sometimes acting honestly (one does not need to always cheat or lie in order to
be dishonest. Doing so occasionally might be enough). I also consider and reject
an argument from Harman that people can be expected to differ in their global
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traits, which would lead them to act differently from each other in the same
circumstances. Thus, he argues, evidence showing people act in similar ways in
the same experimental settings shows that people do not have such traits. I
argue that the notion of global traits does not imply that people must differ in
their possession of such traits. If they have similar traits, they would be
expected, for trait reasons, to act in similar ways.
Finally, I consider whether there is positive evidence to support the idea that
people possess global vices. In particular, I discuss a literature on the
phenomenon of ‘moral hypocrisy’ that seems to show that people frequently seek
to appear moral whilst avoiding the costs of actually being moral, when they
can. This offers preliminary support for the view that people might often possess
a vice like selfishness.
In Chapter 5, I turn to a recent iteration of the situationist challenge, in which
Maria Merritt, Doris, and Harman focus on the internal world of emotions,
motivations and decision-making. They argue that evidence shows situational
interference with these kinds of processes, in a way that challenges the virtue
ethical picture of moral reasoning. In order to respond to this version of the
situationist challenge I engage in some groundwork about the picture of traits
under attack. After clarifying Merritt et al.’s argument, I begin with a discussion
of how we should understand traits as dispositions to think, feel and act in
trait-relevant ways. I point to the problems with understanding dispositions as
conditionals, and how these problems translate to the evidence Doris takes to tell
against trait possession. He sidesteps this discussion by claiming that he is
interested in evidential standards of trait attribution, not the metaphysics of
dispositions. However, in making this move he admits that the debate is not
about whether or not people’s character is structured by dispositional traits, but
about whether and how we can attribute traits to one another. I then turn to a
different discussion about the relationship of traits to dispositions, namely the
distinction between those traits that can be thought of as reactive dispositions
and those that cannot. I follow Jonathan Webber in arguing that the situationist
argument primarily attacks only the former group. This reveals another
subgroup of global traits that are not impacted by the situationist argument.
Next, I turn to a discussion about rational virtues. Here I draw on a number of
virtue ethicists’ work to clarify how they understand virtues as rational traits,
and the picture of practical rationality that they describe, to see whether Merritt
et al.’s attack is on target. I conclude that whilst there is a role for automaticity
in virtuous reasoning and action, the sensitivity to reasons that is an important
part of the virtue ethicist’s account does leave their view open to a challenge
focused on the situational disruption of automatic cognition. In the next section,
I further clarify the ways in which automaticity can play a role in character, such
as in the habituation of good behaviour, and the rapid and subconscious
response to good moral reasons. In particular, I note Nancy Snow’s distinction
between goal-dependent automaticity and preconscious automaticity, and
Webber and Clea Rees’ use of the psychological construct of ‘attitudes’ as a
vehicle for modelling the role of automaticity and habituation in developing
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character. However, I note that Snow’s distinction is not a suitable response to
Merritt et al., as the kind of cases they focus on are not instances of
goal-dependent automaticity. Whilst the distinction is important, it is not
enough to meet the challenge. Nor does Webber and Rees’ discussion satisfy the
situationist challenge.
In section 7 of the chapter, I introduce the notion of reasons-responsiveness,
which I use to respond to Merritt et al.’s challenge. I begin by describing John
Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s account of reasons-responsiveness. In
particular, I discuss their distinction between reasons-receptivity and
reasons-reactivity. I then argue that the challenge brought by Merritt et al.
focuses on the reasons-receptivity of traits. In section 8, I give more detail about
how their automaticity challenge focuses on people’s receptivity to reasons. I
argue that a shortcoming in reasons-reactivity would not clearly warrant the
view that people do not possess a trait, and that much of the experimental
evidence could be explained by such a shortcoming. That is, people may be
reliably sensitive to a reason for action, but not be suitably motivated to act by
it. I also argue that, on the character pessimism view, people might well be both
receptive and reactive to morally bad reasons.
In section 9, I argue that the challenge to other-oriented attention is not
clearly a challenge to the possession of certain vices, such as selfishness and
laziness. Unlike the virtues Merritt et al. have in mind, these vices do not
require consistent other-oriented attention. I then consider an alternative
challenge to character pessimism, based on evidence about our biased perception
and reasoning. There are many examples of how people reason badly, such as
overweighing initial evidence, or overvaluing evidence that confirms their beliefs
and undervaluing contradictory evidence. This biased way that we perceive the
world may offer a challenge to our reliable sensitivity to moral reasons. The way
we construe our situations is also influenced by our personal history and ongoing
interests, in that these factors help decide what appears as salient to us in our
surroundings. I argue that our personal history and ongoing interests are a
legitimate reflection of our traits, and thus their impact on our situational
construal is relevant evidence of our character traits. Whilst we are bad at
selecting and processing data, this is not so much a challenge to the possession of
traits as a reflection of our bad reasoning performance. Finally, I argue that
evidence of moral hypocrisy reveals that people’s motivations might be worse
than they wish to admit. Thus, an alternative explanation of the ‘moral
dissociation’ between people’s reported values and their actions is that their
reported values are not what they actually are moved by. This aspect of
character pessimism offers a different explanation of the dissociation than
Merritt et al.’s preferred account.
In Chapter 6, I discuss what would follow from the diagnosis, if it were indeed
correct, that robust vices are prevalent in the population. I consider what kinds
of strategies people might have for improving themselves. First, focusing on
internal improvements, I discuss research into cognitive dissonance, moral
identity and moral disengagement. I take this work to indicate some promising
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lines of research that could be used in attempts at self-improvement. I also
consider how research into emotion manipulation may be helpful in getting
people to act better. Second, I look at possible external improvements that
people can make to better themselves and their behaviour. I discuss a number of
interesting lines of research that look at the impact of environmental
manipulation on behaviour, but I stress that the impact of this manipulation is
best understood by considering how the environment affects the internal world of
the people involved. I therefore conclude that people seeking self-improvement
would do best to take account of both internal and external strategies and how
they interact with each other.
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